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Abstract
Background
Public health’s terms of engagement with unhealthy commodity industries (alcohol, tobacco
and ultra-processed food and drinks) have become increasingly contested in policy and
research. We sought to identify approaches that could attract consensus support within and
across policy domains.
Methods
Using snowball sampling, we undertook an online survey of 335 health researchers, advo-
cates and policymakers, in 40 countries, assessing responses to stated principles, claims
and recommendations for engaging with unhealthy commodity industries in relation to key
policy and research initiatives.
Results
Most respondents identified a fundamental conflict between industry interests and public
health objectives for all three industries, with agreement greatest in relation to tobacco and
weakest for food. This pattern was replicated across diverse questions regarding potential
forms of engagement, including in rejecting voluntarism and partnership approaches to
health policy. While awareness of tobacco industry tactics to influence policy and research
was higher than for alcohol and food, most respondents rejected the view that the influence
of the latter was less significant for public health. Proposals that health and research organi-
sations should divest their funds attracted less support with respect to food, while restricting
publication of industry-funded research in academic journals was the issue that most divided
opinion. Respondents reported most difficulty in answering questions about the food
industry.
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Conclusions
The strong consensus around restricting interactions with the tobacco industry supports
increased implementation of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control’s conflict
of interest provisions. There is strong support for the extension of such practices to the alco-
hol industry, challenging current norms. More mixed responses indicate a need for greater
clarity in defining the food industry, and for research analyzing links, similarities and differ-
ences across different types of unhealthy commodity producers. Partnership approaches to
addressing non-communicable diseases seem incapable of attracting widespread support
across public health, challenging practice in many contexts.
Background
Non-communicable disease (NCD) epidemics are increasingly recognised as being driven by
transnational corporations involved in the production, manufacture and retail of unhealthy
commodities. This suggests that the extensive institutional and financial links between such
corporations and public health researchers, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and
health and development agencies are characterised by complex and potentially conflicting
interests. [1] These complexities are highlighted via the increased prominence of NCDs in the
global health agenda since the 2011 UN High Level Meeting; [2] for example, concerns about
the terms on which public health interacts with industries such as alcohol and ultra-processed
food and drinks have contributed to the tortuous progress of WHO’s proposed framework for
engagement with non-state actors. [3,4] Such tensions are also evident in many national con-
texts, epitomised in England by the withdrawal of health advocates from government con-
vened Public Health Responsibility Deals (PHRD) with private sector actors, including the
alcohol and food industries. [5]
Underlying these debates is a distinctive pattern of practices and norms within tobacco con-
trol policy and research that, conversely, seeks to minimise industry engagement. 6] These
practices mean that manufacturers of tobacco products are often explicitly excluded from both
the making of health policy and the conduct of health research. This exclusion is embedded in
the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), which starkly contrasts with
the partnership, voluntarism and self-regulatory approaches widely employed in strategies to
reduce dietary and alcohol related ill-health. FCTC Article 5.3, for example, requires parties
to protect health policymaking from tobacco industry interference. [7] Tobacco industry inter-
actions with health researchers are widely rejected, given extensive evidence of industry
manipulation of science, [8,9] and some major funders and medical publishers have adopted
restrictions regarding industry sponsored research. [10,11]
A longstanding depiction of the fundamental conflict of interest between the tobacco indus-
try and public health as unique—‘tobacco exceptionalism’ [6]—has been associated with reti-
cence to extend such practices to the alcohol and food industries. Yet this exceptionalism is
being challenged amid calls for framework conventions to address alcohol or nutrition [12–
14] and other strategies to limit opportunities for industry engagement in policymaking. [1]
Interest in exploring more cohesive policy approaches across these industries is further stimu-
lated by emerging evidence of strategic similarities, [15–17] and by their comparable global
health impacts [1,18] and economic and social costs. [1,19]
Research to date has not, however, explored support within public health for extending the
practices and norms of tobacco control to other contexts, or for retaining divergent policy
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approaches. Following requests from health advocates to consider scope for a consensus state-
ment on engagement between public health and unhealthy commodity industries, we sought
to address this gap via a scoping survey of public health academics, advocates and policy-
makers. Here, we focus on three key aspects of the findings. First, we map the extent of varia-
tion within the public health community in perceptions of the alcohol, food, and tobacco
industries. Second, we examine popular rationales for distinctions between the three. Finally,
we consider whether the results indicate an emerging consensus around specific policies and
practices for commercial sector engagement in, or exclusion from health policy and research.
Methods
An online scoping survey was conducted to assess the views of health researchers, advocates
and policymakers regarding appropriate forms of engagement between public health and
unhealthy commodity industries. The survey’s introduction explained that we were focusing
on attitudes to policy and research engagement with manufacturers of tobacco, alcohol and
ultra-processed food and drink products [1] (abbreviated in the questions to ‘tobacco’, ‘alco-
hol’ and ‘food’: see S1 File—Survey Questions). Rather than reflecting the views of a clearly-
defined group of respondents, this survey was intended as a scoping exercise within a loosely-
categorised sample of self-identified public health professionals with a stated interest in pre-
vention of NCDs. Based on the contact lists of the authors and an expert panel, and using a
snowball approach to recruitment, the survey aimed to provide a broadly descriptive account
of the range of views held by those participating, recognising that these respondents come
from a broad range of geographical and professional contexts within public health.
The survey instrument was developed using the online software tool SurveyExpression. The
survey questionnaire presented respondents with a series of key claims and recommendations
regarding the relationship between public health and the three industry groups (see S1 File–
Survey Questions). These claims were drawn from the academic literature, [1] key national
and international policy initiatives, [20,21] and (with reference to approaches used in tobacco
control) the survey drew on guidelines and policies to restrict tobacco industry interference in
policy and research. [10–11,22]
A pilot version of this questionnaire was reviewed by 12 experts working on alcohol, food
and tobacco-related health issues across academic and policy contexts in diverse countries.
This group of individuals was identified via investigators’ professional networks, relevant aca-
demic, research and policy institutions. The panel’s comments were used to refine the ques-
tionnaire and develop an accompanying webpage [23] to provide further information for
potential survey participants as well as explanatory comments on contested terms employed in
survey questions. This research was approved by the School of Social & Political Science’s
Research Ethics Subcommittee at the University of Edinburgh on the basis that it met Level 1
requirements (i.e. that the research entailed no substantive ethical risks that could be reason-
ably foreseen).
The final version of the questionnaire included 23 individual questions (see S1 File). It
explored responses across four areas: broad principles for public health’s engagement with the
tobacco, alcohol and food industries; respondents’ awareness of industry tactics to influence
policy; recommendations for appropriate engagement with these industries in health gover-
nance; and cross-industry comparisons and distinctions (focusing on understandings of similar-
ities and differences with tobacco). Within each of these areas, questions were organised to
allow comparison of responses across the three industry categories (tobacco, alcohol and
food). Respondents could elect not to answer any particular question. A final page asked
whether respondents had experienced particular difficulty in answering questions on any one
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industry. Respondents were also invited to provide information on their geographical and
institutional location, and their professional role.
Our target ‘population’ for the survey was broadly conceived as members of the global pub-
lic health community with a particular interest in prevention of NCDs–including scholars,
advocates and policymakers whose work relates to health aspects of tobacco, alcohol and ultra-
processed food and beverages. Since there is obviously no universal register of such diverse
individuals, we necessarily employed a non-random sample to distribute the questionnaire,
using existing contact lists from amongst the authors and the expert group and inviting
respondents to forward the survey on to colleagues to whom it might be of interest. There was
no intention to conduct a representative survey of experts across the world. Use of a non-ran-
dom sampling frame was judged to be appropriate given the exploratory nature of the study,
and the absence of a practical alternative. Given that this area is poorly researched, a mapping
study which identifies existing perceptions (rather than attempting to evaluate their prevalence
in the whole expert community) was considered as a pertinent initial step.
In July 2015 the survey was distributed via e-mail across professional network contacts,
both in the UK and internationally, and via relevant groups such as the UK Centre on Tobacco
and Alcohol Studies, Alcohol Health Alliance’s newsletter, and Canada’s Centre for Science in
the Public Interest and the Politics of Health listserve. We opportunistically sought views from
a wide range of public health scholars, advocates and policymakers working in diverse geo-
graphical contexts, recognising that no formal sampling frame exists for such diverse commu-
nities. Respondents were encouraged to distribute the survey as they saw fit, with no explicit
restrictions. As response rates slowed, a final round of reminders was sent and the survey was
closed in September 2015.
A total of 335 respondents completed the survey, with specific item responses ranging from
245 to 330. Survey respondents worked in over 40 countries, with the UK and Canada being
most frequently cited, followed by Australia and the USA, and with substantive contributions
from respondents across Africa, Asia and Latin America (with at least 16 responses from each
of those regions). The diverse foci of current work and institutional affiliations identified by
respondents are indicated in Figs 1 and 2.
As with any non-probability sample, we cannot estimate the degree to which our results are
generalizable to the wider population of researchers, advocates and policymakers. However,
findings of this study can provide an insight into existing attitudes to commercial sector
engagement in health policy and research and can be used to inform further research in this
area, for instance for generating hypotheses and testing them on a wider expert population by
means of random sampling designs.
Results
As noted above, a total of 335 respondents completed the survey, with response rates for indi-
vidual questions ranging from 73–99% (see S2 File–Results Frequency Distribution for the full
aggregate survey results including numbers responding to each item).
Principles of industry engagement in health policy
Reflecting contemporary understandings of ‘good governance’, [24] an initial question sought
responses to the claim that active participation of all key stakeholders, including industry, is
vital to effective health governance. While a clear majority of respondents opposed the partici-
pation of tobacco and alcohol industries in health governance, there was a more mixed
response in relation to the food industry (Fig 3).
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A substantial majority of respondents identified a ‘fundamental and irreconcilable conflict
between industry interests and public health objectives’ in relation to all three industries,
although the proportion of participants agreeing with this statement varied from over 90% for
tobacco to around two-thirds in the case of food. The argument that public health researchers,
advocates and practitioners should not accept funding from the tobacco industry was corre-
spondingly supported by around 90% (comparing with 86% and 72% for alcohol and food
industries respectively). There was near unanimous support for the adoption of policies to
improve accountability and transparency in interactions between public sector employees and
these industries, with around 95% of respondents agreeing with this statement in each of the
three contexts.
The dual claim that ‘tobacco is a special case, and the principle of precluding partnership
and minimising engagement should not be extended to [alcohol / food]’ induced a mixed
response, with respondents’ comments suggesting this partly reflected uncertainty in interpret-
ing the claim. Nevertheless, a majority of respondents to this question disagreed with the state-
ment in relation to both alcohol and food, suggesting broad interest in the potential
application of practices developed in tobacco control to manage interactions with other
unhealthy commodity industries.
Industry tactics to influence policy
The survey sought to examine awareness of a range of industry tactics to shape policies,
adapted from a WHO list of tactics employed by the tobacco industry. [25] Three broad
Fig 1. Foci of respondents current work (number of respondents in each category).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0182612.g001
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patterns are evident in responses here (see Table 1). First, for routine activities that most
industries might be expected to utilise (philanthropy, corporate social responsibility, public
relations, employing consultants, lobbying) there was minimal variation in respondents’
awareness of behaviours across the three industries. Second, for activity descriptions that may
imply more questionable or potentially deceptive use of financial resources to exert influence
(direct funding of politicians or parties; creation or funding of alliances or front groups; fund-
ing research to create or maintain doubt about health implications; and ‘revolving door’
recruitment of key officials or politicians), respondents were slightly more likely to be aware of
these tactics in relation to the tobacco industry than with alcohol or food. Third, awareness of
the use of litigation, trade agreements and intimidation of opponents was much more strongly
associated with the tobacco industry (with around twice as many respondents aware of evi-
dence in relation to tobacco than to alcohol or food industries).
Interestingly, one tactic was more strongly associated with alcohol and food companies
than the tobacco industry; only around one quarter of respondents were aware of funding of
health promotion activities or pre-emption of policies by the tobacco industry, though both
have long been documented. [25]
Appropriate engagement in health governance
Opinions on how best to manage engagement with the three industries were sought across
four broad types of recommendation. First, respondents were presented with positive asser-
tions of the merits of voluntarism and partnership with the private sector. There was very
Fig 2. Institutional affiliation of respondents (number of respondents in each category).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0182612.g002
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limited support for the claim that voluntary agreements with industry would enable public
health to progress more rapidly than via legislation (ranging from under 5% for tobacco to
14% for food). There was modest support for promoting multi-stakeholder partnerships with
industry to allow access to its resources and expertise; 28% agreed with respect to the food
industry, under 20% for alcohol and 13% for tobacco. Alongside some support for partnerships
Fig 3. Level of agreement with the statement. “Enabling the active participation of all key stakeholders, including this industry, is
vital to effective health governance” regarding Alcohol, Food, and Tobacco (percentage of respondents choosing each category).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0182612.g003
Table 1. Percentage of respondents indicating awareness of evidence for specific industry tactics to influence health policy (total N: 335).
ALCOHOL FOOD TOBACCO
Employ consultants 50.6 45.8 53.0
Create or fund alliances or front groups 49.4 40.2 55.1
Direct political funding of parties and/or politicians 39.0 33.9 44.0
Funding of health promotion activities and/or pre-emption of policies 49.4 52.7 40.5
Funding research to create/maintain doubt about health implications 40.5 43.5 54.8
Intimidation of individuals or organisations that favour regulation of industry/product 23.8 17.0 42.3
Lobbying 58.3 56.3 59.8
Recruit key government officials or politicians (revolving door) 35.4 30.7 39.6
Philanthropy 45.5 44.9 42.6
Corporate social responsibility 48.5 47.3 44.3
Public relations / efforts to shape public perceptions of industry and/or its products 57.7 57.7 55.7
Litigation 28.0 21.1 50.6
Use of trade agreements 26.8 25.3 43.2
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0182612.t001
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with the food industry, however, it is worth noting that strong disagreement with this proposal
was still by far the most popular response.
Second, respondents were asked about proposals on restricting industry engagement in pol-
icy. Excluding industry from policy formulation but recognising roles in implementation [1]
attracted majority support in all three cases. Substantial majorities also supported the sugges-
tion that public and third sector organisations should reject partnerships and non-binding
agreements with the tobacco, alcohol and food industries, with a near identical pattern of
agreement that the public health community should not engage with social responsibility
initiatives.
Third, a series of claims advocating abandonment of financial links, both in terms of invest-
ments and research funding, elicited a strong consensus across alcohol and tobacco that was
less clear in relation to the food industry. Full divestment of funds by, firstly, health charities,
public sector organisations and health campaigning organisations and, secondly, universities
and other higher education institutions, was strongly supported by around two-thirds of
respondents for the alcohol industry and over three-quarters for tobacco, but in both cases less
than 40% strongly agreed in relation to food. A similar pattern characterised responses to sug-
gestions that universities should refuse to accept funding from these industries and that health
journals should refuse to publish industry-funded research; around two-thirds agreed in rela-
tion to alcohol, three quarters in relation to tobacco companies but just over half for the food
industry.
Responses to a contrasting claim, that academic journals should publish industry-funded
research subject to requirements regarding declaration of interests, suggests high levels of divi-
sion and (given preceding responses) inconsistency. Around half agreed with academic jour-
nals publishing research funded by the food industry on this basis, while agreement also
slightly outnumbered disagreement in relation to alcohol. This was the statement in the survey
that most divided opinion in relation to the tobacco industry, with around 40% agreeing with
publication of industry-funded research and around half disagreeing.
Cross-industry comparisons
The final section of the survey examined the extent to which respondents regarded the influ-
ences of the alcohol and food industries on policy and research as less significant for public
health than for tobacco. The food and alcohol industries were seen as less important than
tobacco in this context by around one third and one quarter of respondents respectively, with
small majorities disagreeing in both cases.
Those respondents identifying either the food or alcohol industry as being less significant
to public health were then asked to select from a list of possible explanations. In relation to
food, the three most popularly cited reasons were that food products were seen as less harmful
at the individual level, less harmful at the population level and as more socially acceptable in
the respondent’s work context, with each selected by more than half of these respondents. In
relation to alcohol, explanations appear more diffuse. Only the perception that alcohol prod-
ucts are less harmful than tobacco at the individual level was selected by a majority of such
respondents, followed by lower recognition of evidence of the alcohol industry seeking to mis-
lead the public and policymakers, and the identification of alcohol products as less harmful at
a population level.
Comments on survey instrument
Finally, respondents were able to indicate whether they had experienced difficulties in answer-
ing questions relating to any of these industries. Over a third of respondents here reported no
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particular difficulty, while very few of those reporting difficulties cited the tobacco industry. In
contrast, 14% found it difficult to answer questions on alcohol and over one quarter cited diffi-
culties relating to food industry questions. When asked to describe such difficulties, those cit-
ing the alcohol industry referred primarily to limited knowledge of or engagement with
alcohol issues, uncertainty over health harms, or to working in national contexts where the for-
mal alcohol industry is restricted. Answers in relation to the food industry were more diverse
and complex, with the most frequently cited reasons being food’s status as a necessity, along-
side a series of closely related uncertainties over how best to define the food industry, percep-
tions that its structure is more diverse than those of alcohol or food, and that it comprises
beneficial products and actors as well as harmful ones.
Study limitations
We necessarily employed a non-random sampling strategy in distributing the survey question-
naire. Since there is no universal register of our target population (members of the global pub-
lic health community with a particular interest in prevention of NCDs), we were reliant on
existing contact lists and snowball sampling. Undoubtedly, we were not able to contact all
members of our target population: some eligible individuals may have received multiple invita-
tions to participate in the survey, while many others would not have been contacted at all. Sim-
ilarly, we have no way of estimating what proportion of eligible respondents were included in
the survey, or what proportion of those invited actually participated. We are therefore unable
to calculate some parameters normally associated with survey-based research, such as the sur-
vey response rate, and the results of this pilot have limited generalisability.
Nevertheless, we are confident our sample provides non-proportionate representation of
key groups, including public health professionals working in a range of roles and geographical
contexts. While our results cannot be generalised to the whole public health community, we
believe the descriptive account of the results from this scoping survey provides valuable infor-
mation about the range of views that exist among those with an interest in NCD prevention
and a qualitative sense of the extent to which these view diverge or converge in relation to key
issues.
We are unable to locate any previous research exploring the views of diverse public health
professionals regarding appropriate terms for engagement with the producers of unhealthy
commodities (beyond tobacco), nor assessing the extent to which there may be enthusiasm or
reluctance for extending the practices and norms of tobacco control to other contexts. Given
the scarcity of evidence in this area, we believe this scoping survey makes a valuable contribu-
tion by mapping the range of existing perceptions within public health and providing a broad
sense of the extent–or absence–of consensus around specific principles and approaches.
Discussion and conclusions
This survey examined attitudes within the public health community to managing the terms of
engagement with alcohol, food and tobacco industries in health policy and research. Perhaps
its most predictable aspect is the very strong consensus around measures to pro-actively
restrict the terms of any interaction with the tobacco industry. The consistency with which the
language of multi-stakeholder partnership is rejected, and the near unanimity with which
health objectives and tobacco industry interests are seen as incompatible, demonstrates strong
support for the principles of protecting health policy from tobacco industry interference. This
suggests that efforts to improve on the rather limited track record of many governments in
implementing FCTC Article 5.3 [26] are likely to be well supported within public health.
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There are, nonetheless, two interesting caveats. First, the majority of respondents agreed
that while the tobacco industry should be excluded from policy formulation, it could have a
significant role in policy implementation. While the terms of this ‘significant role’ weren’t
specified or explored, it may suggest willingness for more expansive engagement than that rec-
ommended in Article 5.3 implementation guidelines’ call to “protect the formulation and
implementation of public health policies for tobacco control from the tobacco industry to the
greatest extent possible” (emphasis added). [22] Secondly, the survey suggests a level of ongo-
ing uncertainty or disquiet regarding policies around publication of research funded by the
tobacco industry.
Viewed from an alcohol policy perspective, the survey responses provide a consistent pat-
tern by which approaches to restrict engagement with the alcohol industry are supported
almost as widely as for the tobacco industry. The widely shared perceptions of the alcohol and
tobacco industries, and common attitudes to minimising interactions depicted above, con-
trasts with stark divergence in regulatory practice at national and international levels. If the
survey offers encouragement to those making the case for expansion of tobacco control poli-
cies and practices to alcohol, it also highlights the need to increase awareness of industry tactics
to influence policy and of alcohol-related harm at a population level. In the context of recent
European legal challenges by alcohol industry actors to the implementation of minimum unit
pricing for alcohol in Scotland, [27] health advocates might have hoped that more than a quar-
ter of respondents would identify litigation as a tactic used by this industry.
Survey findings offer the least clarity on how to manage interactions between public health
and the ‘food industry’. While the introduction to our survey specified that in this context we
were referring to “the parts of this sector that manufacture ultra-processed food and drinks”,
this ambiguity highlights widespread uncertainty about how to define this industry and/or
how to differentiate between those of its actors viewed as capable of contributing positively to
population health and those that are not. In relation to the food industry, statements about reg-
ulatory strategies consistently follow similar patterns to those for tobacco and alcohol but
exhibit lower levels of consensus. This is particularly so with respect to funding and research,
where there were substantial gaps between proportions advocating divestment of tobacco or
alcohol shares compared with the food industry, and much more limited support for non-pub-
lication of research funded by the food industry.
The above difficulties and differences should not, however, disguise the extent to which per-
spectives and preferences are held in common across all three industries, nor the scale of
respondents’ divergence from politically dominant commitments to partnership. While sym-
pathy for engagement is greater with respect to the food industry, a very positively worded
statement on the importance of active participation of all key stakeholders to effective health
governance did not receive majority endorsement for any industry. By contrast, a majority of
respondents supported statements identifying food industry interests as being fundamentally
in conflict with public health, rejecting partnerships and non-binding agreements, and advo-
cating the industry’s exclusion from policy formulation.
All of this demonstrates the lack of support within public health for policy approaches
involving partnership working and voluntary agreements, such as England’s Public Health
Responsibility Deals and WHO’s Global Coordination Mechanism for NCDs. Given the
importance of clear policy objectives to effective health advocacy, [28–29] these indications of
consensus within the public health community suggest that core elements of national and
international strategies to reduce NCDs are likely to remain contentious.
To tackle this impasse, we urgently need a research agenda capable of a more nuanced anal-
yses of unhealthy commodity producers and their engagement in health policy and research.
Such an agenda needs to more carefully define industries, particularly for food, and consider
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the case for delineating particular kinds of actors within industries (e.g. those operating on a
small-scale where public health impacts may be negligible, or larger actors whose overall prod-
uct portfolio might be considered neutral or positive in health terms). Research is also needed
to examine structural links between companies and across industries, epitomised, for example,
by the brewing giant SAB Miller being part-owned by Altria (producers of Marlboro ciga-
rettes) and having a major distribution deal with Coca Cola. [30] Such interpenetration calls
into question governance practices that distinguish between tobacco and other unhealthy
commodity industries, pre-supposing that these can be clearly differentiated.
Importantly, there is an apparent consensus within public health that the interests of alco-
hol and food manufacturers fundamentally conflict with public health objectives. Given this
widespread recognition, it seems clear that health governance and research require more
coherent approaches to the terms with which they engage with unhealthy commodity produc-
ers. This could involve examining how the adaptation of tobacco control practices and norms,
including those arising from Article 5.3, [22] might inform measures to improve transparency
and governance across NCD policy debates.
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